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Abstract
According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn’t rely epis-
temically on other people’s say-so, at least not if one is in a position to
evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work
in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which
is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to
the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that
that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should not lead us to
entirely abandon the Enlightenment ideal of epistemically autonomous
agents. Specifically, I suggest that it is an appropriate ideal for those
who serve as experts in a given epistemic community, and develop a
notion of expert acceptance to make sense of this. I go on to show that,
all other things being equal, this kind of epistemic autonomy among
experts makes their joint testimony more reliable, which in turn brings
epistemic benefits both to laypeople and to experts in other fields.
1 Introduction
You and I both believe that the Earth was formed billions of years ago. And
yet neither of us has directly examined any of the scientific evidence for that
claim, or indeed for the various theories and models that underwrite it. In
this case, as in so many other cases, our opinions are based on the testimony
of experts. In an influential article, Goldman (2001) considered the issue
of how laypeople should form and modify their opinions in response to the
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testimony of such experts. Accordingly, much of the literature has focused
on epistemological problems about expert testimony from the point of view of
laypeople, i.e. non-experts.1 However, the same issue can also be considered
from the point of view of the experts themselves. In this paper, we will be
concerned with how (if at all) an expert’s own opinions should be influenced
by the opinions of other experts within the same area of specialization. Should
these experts treat each other in much the same way as laypeople should treat
experts – i.e. as sources of information on the basis of which to form new
opinions and modify existing ones?
In considering this question, one is immediately struck by two prima facie
plausible but seemingly conflicting considerations. On the one hand, there is
a common presumption that inquiring minds should not rely on other peo-
ple’s say-so, at least not if they are in a position to evaluate the relevant
evidence for themselves. The importance of this kind of intellectual indepen-
dence has been emphasized by several influential Enlightenment thinkers –
including Descartes, Locke, and Kant.2 Indeed, this common sentiment ap-
pears especially strong when it is directed at experts, such as scientists and
other scholars, who are frequently accused of ‘groupthink’ and ‘herd mentality’.
Accusations of this sort assume that experts should strive to be epistemically
autonomous in something like the following sense:
Epistemic autonomy: S is epistemically autonomous with regard to a
proposition P to the extent that S’s epistemic attitude to P is not directly
1In Goldman’s terminology, the literature has concerned the “novice/expert problem” as
opposed to “expert/expert problem” (Goldman, 2001, esp. 89-90). For recent discussion
of the former, see e.g. Coady (2006), Collins and Evans (2007), Lane (2014), and Martini
(2014).
2Rule III in Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1628, 13) explicitly forbids
inquiring minds from relying on “what other people have thought”. Similarly, Locke (1689,
I, iv, 23) claims that “[t]he floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one
jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true.” Finally, Kant (1784, 54) goes so far
as to identify the Enlightenment with the tendency to think for oneself:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Imma-
turity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance
of another. [...] The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have
courage to use your own understanding!
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influenced by other agents’ epistemic attitudes to P .3
On the other hand, it seems obvious that if laypeople should treat expert opin-
ion as a source of information, then so should other experts. For example, if an
expert X1 has not yet made up her mind about some new hypothesis H within
her domain of specialization D, and then learns that her generally-trustworthy
colleague X2, who also specializes in D, strongly endorses H, it would seem
that X1 should take that as a reason to endorse H as well.4 However, this ap-
parently reasonable procedure seems to conflict with epistemic autonomy since
it clearly involves X1’s opinion about H being directly influenced by another
person’s opinion about H, viz. X2’s.
One of the things I hope to do in this paper is to suggest a more sophisti-
cated conception of epistemic autonomy that eliminates the conflict between
these two considerations. In particular, I will appeal to a version of the well-
known distinction between belief and acceptance (Cohen, 1992) to argue that
the ideal of epistemic autonomy should not be seen as applying to belief, but
instead to a kind of expert acceptance (section 2). Having clarified the rele-
vant notion of epistemic autonomy in this way, I spend the rest of the paper
exploring what sort of rational basis, or rationale, there could be for the ideal
of epistemic autonomy among experts (section 3). Roughly, my suggestion
will be that epistemic autonomy is a kind of social good – something that is
valuable for its effects on communities of truth-seeking agents – rather than
something that individual agents benefit from directly. I argue for this by
showing that, all other things being equal, agreement in a group of epistemi-
cally autonomous experts is a more reliable guide to truth than an otherwise
identical agreement in a group of non-autonomous experts.
Although my approach in what follows will abstract away from any par-
3This is a preliminary definition of epistemic autonomy that captures the spirit of what
I will be concerned with in this paper. In section 2, I clarify and modify the definition
in several ways; in section 4, I furthermore provide a probabilistic analysis of epistemic
autonomy.
4Indeed, epistemological theories of testimony on both sides of the reductionism/anti-
reductionism divide (see, e.g., Coady, 1992; Fricker, 1994) would seem to imply that in such
a situation, X1’s opinion should be at least somewhat influenced by X2’s opinion – whether
that’s because X1 has independent reasons to trust X2 (as per reductionism) or because X1
is a priori entitled to trust X2 (as per anti-reductionism).
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ticular kinds or domains of expertise, I will take the scientific expert as a
paradigm case of the kind of expert with which I am concerned. There are
a few different reasons for this. First, the kind of expert that interests me is
one that non-experts can identify relatively easily; and I’ll assume that sci-
entific experts can be identified by appealing to their academic qualifications,
research output, or other relatively transparent indicators. Second, the ex-
perts I am concerned with will be able to provide testimony to non-experts
about the truth-value of theories or hypotheses; and I take it that scientific
experts – perhaps in contrast to, e.g., expert craftspeople – are generally able
to provide such testimony. Third, my kind of experts will have a limited and
relatively well-defined domain of expertise, such that they too will need to rely
on other experts when reaching beyond that domain; again, I take this to be
true of scientific experts (at least in contemporary science). That said, what
I have to say below about the value of epistemic autonomy among scientific
experts applies equally to other kinds of experts in so far as they satisfy these
conditions.
2 The Ideal of Expert Autonomy
Before we start exploring why it would be valuable for experts to be epistemi-
cally autonomous, we must first say more about what it would be for experts
to be autonomous in the epistemic sense. I will approach this task by con-
sidering two potential objections to the idea that experts should be epistem-
ically autonomous, and then show how the specific conception of epistemic
autonomy that I have in mind avoids these objections. Most of the section
concerns the objection that being epistemically autonomous cannot be epis-
temically rational, since it involves deliberately ignoring other people’s beliefs
even when they are clearly relevant to the truth-value of one’s own beliefs. I
begin, however, with a more fundamental challenge, viz. that it would often
be impossible for experts to remain uninfluenced by their fellow experts. In
many disciplines, experts typically work together in groups and are constantly
5To be sure, the extent to which this is true varies widely from one discipline to the next.
For example, collaboration is less common in mathematics and purely theoretical physics,
but even there the trend seems to be towards increasingly collaborative endeavors.
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communicating with each other.5 So how could epistemic autonomy among
experts be anything other than a pipe-dream, inapplicable in most, if not all,
real circumstances?
In response, let me clarify the notion of ‘epistemic autonomy’ in three im-
portant ways. First, note that our preliminary definition of epistemic auton-
omy holds that an agent is epistemically autonomous with regard to a proposi-
tion P to the extent that her epistemic attitude to P is not directly influenced
by other agents’ epistemic attitudes to P . This is meant to exclude the indi-
rect kind of influence someone can have over another’s opinions in virtue of
presenting that person with evidence or arguments for P that she evaluates
herself. This latter kind of influence would be indirect in that the agent in
question would make up her own mind about P in light of the evidence or
arguments presented to her, as opposed to simply taking another’s word for P
being true.6 Since epistemic autonomy concerns only direct influence, being
epistemically autonomous with regard to P is perfectly compatible with form-
ing and modifying one’s opinions about P in light of evidence and arguments
presented by other people, including other experts.
Another important point is that epistemic autonomy is clearly a matter of
degree. That is, one’s attitudes can be more and less influenced by another
persons’ attitudes, roughly to the extent that one is likely to adopt the other
person’s attitudes. Later (in section 4) I will give a precise probabilistic ex-
plication of what this amounts to. For now, note that even if it is unrealistic
or impossible for experts to be completely autonomous in the above sense, we
can still ask whether having any degree of epistemic autonomy has epistemic
value. What I will argue below is that, all other things being equal, even a very
slight degree of autonomy has a distinct kind of epistemic value. Although this
type of epistemic value can be trumped or outweighed by other considerations
against being epistemically autonomous, such as by the value of reaching a
consensus as quickly as possible, it’s nevertheless true that there is something
valuable about any increased degree of epistemic autonomy. Put differently,
6The distinction I am making here is similar, if not identical, to Gibbard’s distinction
between what he calls ‘authority’ and ‘Socratic influence’ (Gibbard, 1990, 174-5); it is
even more similar, perhaps even identical, to Foley’s distinction between ‘authority’ and
‘influence’ (Foley, 2001, 85).
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the argument will be that being more epistemically autonomous is pro tanto
valuable.
Finally, note that epistemic autonomy is defined relative to a specific propo-
sition P . We can generalize this definition slightly by also defining epistemic
autonomy with respect to a domain of expertise D as being epistemically au-
tonomous with regard to all the propositions in, or relevant to, D.7 So, for
example, a marine biologist might be said to be epistemically autonomous
with regard to salmon hatching in Iceland if she is autonomous with regard
to all propositions about the hatching of Icelandic salmon. Now, while it may
be difficult or even impossible to be epistemically autonomous with regard to
an unrestricted set of all propositions (even within some particular scientific
field or subfield, such as marine biology), it is certainly not impossible to be
epistemically autonomous with regard to a sufficiently restricted domain of ex-
pertise. In our example, it is surely possible for the marine biologist to remain
at least partly uninfluenced (in a direct way) by her colleagues’ opinions on
Icelandic salmon hatching.
I conclude that it is not impossible for experts to be epistemically au-
tonomous in the relevant sense of the term. However, even granting the pos-
sibility of experts exhibiting epistemic autonomy, one might still doubt that
being autonomous would ever be epistemically rational. (This is the second
challenge mentioned above.) Consider, in particular, Linda Zagzebski’s ar-
gument that the ideal of epistemically autonomous belief-formation involves
an ‘egoistic’ discrimination between one’s own evaluation of P and other peo-
ple’s evaluations of P .8 Zagzebski claims that this is incoherent for rational,
truth-seeking agents:
... if the epistemic egoist [i.e., the epistemically autonomous agent]
7This conception of a domain of expertise is a bit rough, but precise enough for our
purposes here. If we want to be more precise, we can simply define a domain of expertise
either as a set of related propositions P1, ..., Pk; or alternatively as an n-tuple one of whose
elements is that set of propositions (where other elements might include, e.g., the methods
used in the domain).
8A similar argument against the ideal of epistemic autonomy is given by Richard Foley
(2001, esp. 99-107). For a slightly different argument for the same conclusion, see Fricker
(2006). Epistemic autonomy should not be confused with what Zagzebski later calls ‘intel-
lectual autonomy’ (Zagzebski, 2013).
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is rational, she is committed to trusting others when they are con-
scientious, when they have the qualities she trusts in herself. Trust-
ing herself commits her to trusting others when they are in the same
position she is in; that is, when they are in similar circumstances,
have apparently similar powers and abilities, and act as conscien-
tiously as she acts when she trusts herself. If she is consistent, she
must trust them as much as herself, other things being equal, since
she has no basis upon which to trust herself more than those she
perceives to be epistemically equally well-placed (Zagzebski, 2007,
257).
Assuming that Zagzebski’s argument is sound, it would seem to undermine
any ideal of epistemic autonomy, including the ideal of epistemic autonomy
for experts.9
Appearances perhaps to the contrary, however, an important form of the
ideal of expert autonomy can be maintained even if one grants Zagzebski’s anti-
egoistic argument. Zagzebski’s argument is concerned with what we should
believe on the basis of other people’s testimony, and it is indeed plausible
that one’s beliefs should reflect the totality of one’s evidence pertaining to
a proposition – including one’s testimonial evidence. However, note that at
least sometimes when we ask experts for their opinion on a given issue, we
are not asking them for what they believe all things considered, i.e. in light of
all the evidence available to them (which includes their testimonial evidence).
9Many other epistemologists would seem to be implicitly committed to the denial of the
ideal of epistemic autonomy for experts. Consider, in particular, the debate about peer
disagreement. Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that, upon discovering that
one disagrees about P with someone who is equally intelligent and equally well-informed
regarding P , one should modify one’s opinion about P by moving closer to the opinion of
one’s peer, i.e. by suspending belief or adopting an intermediate degree of belief in P (see,
e.g. Frances, 2005; Feldman, 2006; Christensen, 2007; Elga, 2007; Lackey, 2010; Matheson,
2015). Assuming that pairs of experts are at least sometimes equally intelligent and well-
informed with regard to some domain of expertise, it follows that experts should generally
not be epistemically autonomous with regard to those domains. Indeed, it would seem
that many non-conciliationists are implicitly committed to rejecting the ideal of epistemic
autonomy for experts as well, since they often acknowledge that at least one of the parties
to the disagreement (viz. the one whose belief is not in fact supported by the evidence)
should modify her opinion on P when realizing that her peer disagrees with her about P
(see, e.g., Kelly, 2005, 2010).
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Rather, we are (sometimes) eliciting their judgment of the extent to which
some specific subset of that evidence – such as the outcome of specific a set
of experiments, tests, or observations – supports a given theory or hypothesis.
For example, a doctor who is asked to give a ‘second opinion’ may be asked
to ‘bracket’ the other doctor’s diagnosis for that purpose, reporting not what
she believes all things considered, but on her own diagnosis based only on the
patient’s symptoms and test results (or some such suitably restricted subset
of her evidence).
So the kinds of opinions we elicit from experts are not always their beliefs all
things considered. To help us understand this, let me introduce a distinction
between belief and acceptance along the lines suggested by Jonathan Cohen
(1992). On Cohen’s distinction, one believes that P just in case one is disposed
to feel it true that P and false that ¬P . As Cohen notes, such a disposition
is quite independent of “whether or not one is willing to act, speak, or reason
accordingly” (Cohen, 1992, 4). By contrast, one accepts that P just in case
one has a policy of treating it as given that P in a particular context, where
treating a proposition as given involves “including that proposition ... among
one’s premisses for deciding what to do or think” in the context in question
(Cohen, 1992, 4). In sum, then, while belief is a matter of what one is disposed
to feel to be true, acceptance is a matter of what one has a policy to treat as
true in a given context.
Belief and acceptance are both broadly-speaking epistemic attitudes, but
they differ in two important respects. First, acceptance is a straightforwardly
voluntary attitude, in the sense that whether we adopt a policy of treating
something as true is under our control in a straightforward way. By contrast,
if our beliefs are under voluntary control at all, it is certainly more difficult to
adopt or reject beliefs at will.10 A second important difference between belief
and acceptance is that the latter is sensitive to context in a way that the former
10That beliefs are involuntary in this way was influentially argued by Williams (1973).
However, one need not assume that beliefs are completely outside of one’s control in order
for there to be a difference between acceptance and belief with respect to the extent to
which they are voluntary or controlled, since acceptance would still be voluntary in a much
more straightforward way. After all, there is no special cognitive effort required to adopt
a policy of treating propositions as given in a particular context, while it would certainly
require some special circumstances and/or abilities to believe a proposition at will.
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is not. Indeed, it is built into the concept of acceptance that one can accept a
proposition – i.e. treat it as given – in some contexts without accepting it in all
contexts. Thus, for example, our doctor may treat her own diagnosis as given
in the context of providing her patient with a second opinion, even though
she may not do so in other contexts (e.g. in discussions with her colleagues).
By contrast, belief is not sensitive to context in the same way. After all, we
would never say that the doctor’s beliefs about the correct diagnosis suddenly
changes when she starts to provide her second opinion.11 The point here is not
that acceptance is context-sensitive whereas belief is not (though that might
also be true); rather, the point is that acceptance is clearly context-sensitive
in a different and much more straightforward way than belief.
Now, since acceptance is relative to a context in this way – one always treats
something as true in a given context – we can distinguish between different
kinds of acceptance depending on the context in which they occur. These
‘contexts’ are perhaps most clearly distinguishable when one explicitly takes
on a specific institutional role that involves treating certain propositions as
given. Our concern here is with what someone treats as true in the context of
their individual pronouncements as experts in a given field – what we might
call expert acceptance. Thus expert acceptance of a proposition P amounts
to having a policy of treating P as given in the context of speaking as an
individual expert in a domain that includes P . As we noted above in the case
of a doctor’s ‘second opinion’, one may offer something as her expert opinion
even if one does not believe it to be true all things considered. Thus this case
illustrates that it is possible for expert acceptance to come apart from belief.
This distinction between belief and expert acceptance allows us to distin-
guish two kinds of epistemic autonomy:
Epistemic autonomyB: S is epistemically autonomousB with respect to
a proposition P to the extent that S’s belief regarding P is not directly
influenced by other agents’ beliefs regarding P .
11Of course, belief (or belief-attributions) may well be context-sensitive in other ways,
e.g. by depending on the context of the person attributing belief in much the same way that
knowledge-attributions are according to epistemic contextualism. See, for example, Cohen
(1986, 2005), DeRose (1992), Lewis (1996), Neta (2002), and Conee (2005).
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Epistemic autonomyA: S is epistemically autonomousA with respect to
a proposition P to the extent that S’s expert acceptance regarding P is not
directly influenced by other agents’ expert acceptance regarding P .
This distinction between two different kinds of epistemic autonomy is im-
portant for present purposes because it opens up the possibility of accepting
Zagzebski’s anti-egoistic argument against autonomous believing – and more
generally of rejecting the idea that believers should ever ignore or dismiss
testimony from their epistemic equals or superiors – and at the same time
recognizing a place for a different type of intellectual independence, viz. epis-
temic autonomyA. After all, recall from our case of the doctor asked to give a
second opinion that there might be reasons for experts in particular to have or
adopt certain epistemic ideals with regard to what they accept in the context
of their work as experts that aren’t also reasons for them to adopt analogous
ideals with regard to their beliefs.12
Of course, I have not yet discussed any such reasons apart from the some-
what vague suggestion that experts should ideally not engage in ‘groupthink’
or exhibit ‘herd mentality’. Fleshing out this suggestion is the task I have set
myself below. But let me first be more precise about the sense in which I take
epistemic autonomyA to be an ideal for experts:
The Ideal of Expert Autonomy: It is pro tanto valuable for experts to
be (more) epistemically autonomousA of other experts with regard to their
mutual domain(s) of expertise.
Put differently, the claim here is that in groups of experts on the same do-
main, there is a pro tanto value to being more rather than less epistemically
autonomousA, where a pro tanto value is a (not merely prima facie) value
12More generally, the idea here is that those who occupy certain roles might be subject to
specific epistemic ideals in what they treat as given in the context of occupying those roles.
This idea should be familiar from the legal domain, e.g. from the way in which jurors are
required to disregard hearsay and illegally obtained evidence in reaching their verdict, even
when such evidence would (and arguably should) influence their private beliefs. Similarly,
it seems at least plausible that methodological norms in various sciences require scientific
acceptance of hypotheses to be based on particular kinds of systematic empirical data and
statistical analysis, rather than, say, on anecdotal and testimonial evidence of various kinds.
(Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analogy.)
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that may be trumped or outweighed by other considerations. Roughly, this
amounts to the claim that there is always something valuable about experts
being epistemically autonomousA to a greater extent, even when this value has
less weight than countervailing considerations.13
Now, my main concern below is with providing a rational basis – a rationale
– for this ideal. What, if anything, makes the Ideal of Expert Autonomy true?
Note that the answer cannot be that being epistemically autonomous makes
each expert in a group individually more reliable, for this is precisely what we
cannot assume in cases when one expert is considering whether to be directly
influenced by the opinions of her fellow experts. Since the expert in question is
assumed to be no more of an expert than her fellow experts, she will be at least
as likely to accept the truth if she blindly trusts her colleagues as if she makes
up her mind independently. To be more precise, then, the question is how
there could be this ideal of expert autonomy given that being epistemically
autonomous does not increase the individual reliability of such experts. In
what follows, I propose to answer this question by appealing to the effects
of epistemic autonomy at the social level of groups of experts with the same
domain of expertise. Specifically, I suggest that the value of expert autonomy
lies in the fact that groups of epistemically autonomous agents can provide us
with an especially reliable kind of testimonial evidence. I will refer to this as
the Whewellian Rationale.
3 Expert Autonomy and Testimonial Consilience
3.1 The Whewellian Rationale
WilliamWhewell coined the term ‘consilience of inductions’ to describe cases in
which a theory receives support from unrelated pieces of evidence, as opposed
to being supported by evidence that is similar or closely related. Whewell
argued that this amounts to an especially powerful type of inductive evidence
13Since I will henceforth only be concerned with epistemic autonomyA (as opposed to
autonomyB), I will often drop the subscript ‘A’ from now on, e.g. writing ‘epistemically
autonomous’ instead of ‘epistemically autonomousA’. I will also frequently use ‘expert
autonomy’ as a shorthand for ‘epistemic autonomy among experts’.
11
in science:
That rules springing from remote and unconnected quarters should
thus leap to the same point, can only arise from that being the point
where the truth resides. [...] Accordingly the cases in which induc-
tions from classes of facts altogether different have thus jumped
together, belong only to the best established theories which the
history of science contains. And as I shall have occasion to refer to
this peculiar feature of their evidence, I will take the liberty of de-
scribing it by a particular phrase; and will term it the Consilience
of Inductions (Whewell, 1858, 88).
Whewell’s point is not just that a theory is better confirmed if more evidence
speaks in favor of it; rather, Whewell is suggesting that, other things being
equal, a theory is better confirmed if the pieces of evidence that support a
theory are independent of each other.
Now, what’s true for evidence generally is also true of testimonial evidence.
If Whewell is right that evidence from independent sources provides stronger
support for theories than otherwise similar evidence from dependent (or less
independent) sources, then a claim accepted on the basis of independent pieces
of testimony should provide stronger support than otherwise similar, but de-
pendent, pieces of testimony. In other words, Whewell’s general point about
the justificatory power of consilient evidence implies that we have more rea-
son to accept what a number of independent agents assert than an otherwise
identical groups of agents whose testimony is dependent in some way. This
is relevant to the Ideal of Expert Autonomy since epistemic autonomy is ef-
fectively a kind of testimonial independence between agents. Thus Whewell’s
point about consilience suggests that epistemic autonomy ensures a kind of
independence between agents that makes their joint testimony a more reliable
guide to truth than it would otherwise be.
In this Whewellian spirit, I want to suggest that the value of expert auton-
omy lies in the fact that an agreement in the testimony of scientific experts is
a more reliable guide to truth when the experts are epistemically autonomous.
This reliability of agreement in expert testimony is in turn valuable because of
its beneficial epistemic effects on those who are not experts on the particular
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issue in question. In particular, it enables experts in other domains to rely on
such testimony in their own research, which promotes cumulative intellectual
progress; similarly, it enables laypeople to safely rely on agreement in expert
testimony in applying the results of experts’ investigations, e.g. in technology
and policy-making, which increases the applicability of these results. In sum:
The Whewellian Rationale: Expert autonomy is pro tanto valuable be-
cause, and in so far as, (W1) agreement in expert testimony is more reliable
when experts are more epistemically autonomousA, and (W2) increased re-
liability of such agreement promotes cumulative intellectual progress and
safe applications of expert inquiry.
I have separated the Whewellian Rationale into two separate claims, (W1)
and (W2), because I will argue for each claim separately (in §3.2 and §3.3
respectively).
Before I do that, however, let me emphasize that the Whewellian Ratio-
nale locates only a pro tanto value in expert autonomy. As such, this value
will have to be weighed against other considerations in determining whether
expert autonomy is valuable all things considered. In particular, it is plausible
that increasing epistemic autonomy among experts would reduce the amount
of agreement among them and/or slow down the process of them reaching
agreement. If so, the value located by the Whewellian Rationale could be out-
weighed by the costs of having fewer hypotheses on which the experts agree
at a given time. This is not an objection to the Whewellian Rationale, since
it does not purport to show that the value of expert autonomy cannot be out-
weighed by other considerations. One might of course wonder whether there
is a way of determining exactly under what circumstances the pro tanto value
of expert autonomy would be outweighed in this way. While this would be a
worthwhile task, I will not offer any suggestions for how to do it below. Thus,
as far as this paper is concerned, we will have to rest content with showing
that expert autonomy is pro tanto valuable, regardless of the circumstances
under which it is also valuable all things considered.
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3.2 How Expert Autonomy Enhances Joint Reliability
(W1) in effect holds that agreement between epistemically autonomous experts
is a more reliable indicator of truth than agreement between less autonomous,
but otherwise identical, experts. Since agreement between epistemically au-
tonomous experts amounts to a kind of testimonial consilience, which is a
special case of what is arguably an especially powerful type of inductive ev-
idence, (W1) already has considerable prima facie plausibility. This section
bolsters this intuition by providing a rigorous probabilistic argument for (W1).
The argument proceeds by comparing the probability that a hypothesis H is
true given that a group of (somewhat) autonomous agents all attest to its
truth, with the probability that H is true given that an otherwise identical
group of less autonomous agents do the same. As we shall see, it can be shown
that the probability for H is higher given agreement among more autonomous
experts than given agreement among their less autonomous counterparts.
To set up the argument, the first thing to do is to find a way to represent
in a probabilistic framework the assumption that one group of experts ex-
hibits more epistemic autonomy than another group.14 Recall that epistemic
autonomyA with regard to some proposition H is defined in terms of the ex-
tent to which an agent’s acceptance of H is not directly influenced by another’s
acceptance of H. This direct influence of one agent’s acceptance of H on an-
other’s translates straightforwardly into a probabilistic framework in terms of
the extent to which one agent’s acceptance of H is positively dependent on
the other agent’s acceptance of H. In probability theory, a collection of n
14The probabilistic conception of epistemic autonomy that I propose below is closely
analogous to a measure of evidential independence that was informally proposed by Howson
and Urbach (1989, 114), and later formalized and generalized by Wayne (1995, 112-113) and
Myrvold (1996, 661-662) (for discussion, see e.g. Fitelson, 2001; Bovens and Hartmann, 2003;
Wheeler, 2009; Claveau, 2013; McGrew, 2016) and to Shogenji’s (1999, 338-340) measure of
coherence among propositions (for discussion, see e.g. Akiba, 2000; Shogenji, 2001; Fitelson,
2003; Olsson, 2005; Schupbach, 2008, 2011). Of course, I am interested here not in the
adequacy of these measure of evidential independence and coherence, but in whether an
analogous measure can be used to account for the value of epistemic autonomy. Although
the literatures on these measures are voluminous, I have not been able to find analogues
of the results discussed below for epistemic autonomy. (Another natural place to look for
analogous results is the literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). Footnote 18
explains why the CJT is not in fact suitable for our purposes here.)
14
propositions, P1, ..., Pn, are said to be (positively) dependent just in case the
probability of their conjunction is greater than the product of their individual
probabilities, i.e. just in case:
Pr
( n∧
i=1
Pi
)
>
n∏
i=1
Pr(Pi) (1)
This is a binary, as opposed to graded, notion of probabilistic dependence – it
tells us when some propositions exhibit any probabilistic dependence at all, but
it doesn’t tell us how much dependence there is between them. Since epistemic
autonomy admits of degrees (cf. section 2), we need a graded, rather than
merely a binary, notion of dependence. Fortunately, however, we can define
a graded notion of dependence, Dep(P1, ..., Pn), as the ratio of the left-hand
side of (1) to its right-hand side:
Dep(P1, ..., Pn) =
Pr
( n∧
i=1
Pi
)
n∏
i=1
Pr(Pi)
(2)
We can use this graded notion of dependence to compare how much proba-
bilistic dependence there is in two collections of propositions of equal size.15
The idea, then, is to represent the relative epistemic autonomy of two other-
wise identical groups of experts in terms of the degree to which their acceptance
of H is dependent on each other’s acceptance – where a greater degree of de-
pendence corresponds to a lesser degree of autonomy. Thus, where ‘Xi(H,E)’
denotes the proposition that an expert Xi with evidence E accepts H, we say
that a group of experts XA1 , ..., XAn exhibits more epistemic autonomy with
respect to H and E than an otherwise similar group of experts XB1 , ..., XBn
just in case:
Dep(XA1 (H,E), ..., X
A
n (H,E)) < Dep(X
B
1 (H,E), ..., X
B
n (H,E)) (3)
15Notice that we can use our graded notion of dependence to define binary notions of
dependence and independence: P1, ..., Pn are positively dependent iff Dep(P1, ..., Pn) > 1,
negatively dependent iff Dep(P1, ..., Pn) < 1, and (mutually) independent otherwise. Thus
we obtain (1) as a special case.
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Now, since this explication of comparative degrees of expert autonomy ap-
peals to probabilities, the question arises how these probabilities should be
interpreted. So far we have been concerned with explicating what it is for
groups of experts to really be more and less autonomous, so these probabilities
must be interpreted as referring to something more objective than a particular
rational agent’s subjective probability assignments, e.g. objective chances or
frequencies. However, in so far as a particular rational agent is aware that
the relevant objective chances or frequencies satisfy the inequality in (3), the
principal principle (in case of objective chances) or the principle of direct infer-
ence (in the case of frequencies) ensures that the agent’s subjective credences
satisfy (3) as well. Thus, in what follows, I will assume that a rational agent’s
subjective probability assignments satisfy this condition – and, more generally,
that such an agent’s probability assignments reflect her knowledge of objective
chances and frequencies.16
What I will seek to show is that, for such a rational agent, agreement
among the more autonomous experts XA1 , ..., XAn is, other things being equal,
a greater indicator of the truth than agreement among their less autonomous
counterparts, XB1 , ..., XBn . So, suppose first that other things are indeed equal;
in particular, suppose that our agent is aware that, given that H is true, the
two groups of experts are equally likely to agree that H is true:
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
∣∣∣H) = Pr( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
∣∣∣H) (4)
Suppose also that our agent is aware that, individually, the corresponding
experts in each group are equally likely to accept H in light of E:
Pr(XAi (H,E)) = Pr(X
B
i (H,E)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (5)
16I will also assume in what follows that all propositions have positive probability (which
ensures that Dep(P1, ..., Pn) is always well-defined). Since rationality is often taken to pro-
hibit assignments of extreme probabilities (i.e. probabilities zero and one), this assumption
can be thought of as built into the requirement that the relevant agent is rational; alterna-
tively, this assumption can be viewed as a restriction of the argument given below – leaving
it as an open question whether the argument can be extended to notions of dependence that
allow for zero-probability events.
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Under these ceteris paribus conditions, it can be shown that (3) entails:
Pr
(
H
∣∣∣ n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
)
> Pr
(
H
∣∣∣ n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
(6)
I.e., the probability that H is true is greater given an agreement among the
more autonomous experts XA1 , ..., XAn than it is given an agreement among
their less autonomous counterparts XB1 , ..., XBn .17 In sum, then, if two pairs of
respectively more and less autonomous experts are otherwise identical in rele-
vant respects – in that the two groups are equally likely to agree on the truth,
and each expert is individually equally likely to accept a given hypothesis H
as the expert’s counterpart in the other group – then agreement on H among
17Proof: We prove that (3), (4), and (5) jointly entail (6). First note that by our definition
of graded dependence, (3) is equivalent to:
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
)
n∏
i=1
Pr(XAi (H,E))
<
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
n∏
i=1
Pr(XBi (H,E))
Given (5), the denominators on each side of this are equal, so we have:
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
)
< Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
Since Pr(H) 6= 0 (see footnote 16), we preserve the inequality when multiplying both sides
with Pr(H):
Pr(H)× Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
)
< Pr(H)× Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
Rearranging, we get:
Pr(H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
) > Pr(H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
Given (4), we preserve the inequality when multiplying each side with the corresponding
side of (4), obtaining:
Pr(H)× Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
) > Pr(H)× Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
By Bayes’s Theorem, this is equivalent to (6).
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the autonomous experts is a more reliable guide to H’s truth. In this sense,
epistemic autonomy among experts increases the probability that agreed-upon
theories are true, other things being equal.18
One might of course question whether the two ceteris paribus conditions
– i.e., equations (4) and (5) – describe features that can and should be held
constant in a comparison between groups with different degrees of epistemic
autonomy. Let’s consider these conditions in reverse order. Equation (5)
requires that, taken one by one, the individual members of the two groups are
exactly comparable with regard to how likely they are to accept H regardless
of its truth (i.e. not conditional on H). Somewhat more precisely, it requires
that the members of each group can be paired, one-to-one, with the members
of the other group in such a way that the paired agents be equally likely to
accept H regardless of whether it is true. As I interpret this condition, it
requires that any bias for or against accepting H held by an agent in one of
18This result may remind some readers of the idea, often associated with Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem (CJT), that under certain conditions a group of independent and individually
competent agents is more likely to be correct in a majority vote than any of the group’s
proper subsets. One might even think that the argument above implicitly appeals to the
CJT. To see why, consider an informal statement of the theorem:
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT): If
(a) each member of a group is more likely than not to reach a correct conclusion (Com-
petence), and
(b) the probabilities of each member reaching a correct conclusion are independent
(Independence),
then the probability that the majority has reached a correct conclusion (i) increases with
the size of the group, and (ii) converges to one as the group’s size goes to infinity.
Condition (b) – Independence – might seem close enough to what I have called ‘epistemic
autonomy’, so it might seem as if the CJT shows how epistemic autonomy increases group
reliability in the relevant way. (Something like this suggestion is made in a different context
by Hazlett (2016, 134-7).)
In fact, however, the CJT is not suitable as part of an argument for (W1). One immedi-
ate problem is that Independence is an extremely demanding (binary) condition, which ef-
fectively applies only when there is no influence at all between the agents in a given group.
This by itself is not a major problem, for there are generalizations of the CJT which do apply
for lesser degrees of independence (e.g., Boland, 1989; Boland et al., 1989; Berg, 1993). The
more serious problem is that the CJT tells us about the reliability of a group as a function
of the group’s size (given Competence and Independence, or some fixed degrees thereof),
but we are not interested in how reliability varies with size of the group. Instead, we are
concerned with how reliability varies with degrees of epistemic autonomy, i.e. degrees of ‘in-
dependence’. Since this factor is a constant in the CJT, the theorem simply doesn’t tell us
what we want to know.
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the groups is matched by a corresponding bias in an agent in the the other
group. This is clearly something that can be held constant even when the two
groups exhibit different degrees of epistemic autonomy, since the epistemic
autonomy exhibited by a group is not a matter of how biased or unbiased
each of its members are regarding H. Furthermore, note that if this condition
is violated, we would be comparing groups with different individual biases
regarding H, which could easily translate into a difference in the likelihoods
that all the members of each group accept H. Thus this is exactly the type
of factor that ought to be held constant as we compare what a consensus in
groups with more versus less epistemic autonomy tells us about whether H is
likely to be true.
Next consider equation (4). It requires that, conditional on H being true,
the two groups of experts are equally likely to agree that H is true. My reason
for including this as a ceteris paribus condition is that if one of the group is
more likely to agree that H is true when H is indeed true, then this would
already favor that group’s consensus over the other group’s as an indicator of
the truth regarding H – regardless of the degree to which the two groups are
epistemically autonomous. For example, one way in which (4) could fail is if
one of the groups was simply more knowledgeable about the sorts of issues that
arise regarding how to evaluate H (e.g. because they have more experience of
evaluating similar hypotheses). This is clearly the sort of factor that we want
to hold fixed in a comparison of how reliable a guide to truth an agreement in
groups of more versus less autonomous experts would be. Hence it certainly
seems desirable to impose the restriction described by equation (4) in our
comparison of more and less epistemically autonomous groups of experts.
One might still worry that this requirement is implausible or rarely satisfied
for groups of agents that exhibit different degrees of epistemic autonomy. If
so, the epistemic value of expert autonomy might seem to be based on an
unrealistic idealization. It is thus of interest to note that (6) can also be
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derived without (4) given the following condition:
Dep(XB1 (H,E), ..., X
B
n (H,E))
Dep(XA1 (H,E), ..., X
A
n (H,E))
>
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
∣∣∣H) (7)
In other words, (4) can be replaced with the condition that the ratio of de-
pendence in the more versus less autonomous group must be greater than the
ratio of their corresponding likelihoods of agreeing on H, conditional on H
being true.19 This additional result tells us that even when the likelihoods of
the two groups agreeing on H given that H is true are unequal – e.g. because
the less autonomous group is simply more knowledgeable regarding H – this
can be outweighed by a corresponding difference in the degree of epistemic
autonomy exhibited by the two groups. Put differently, a consensus among a
more autonomous group of experts would be a more reliable guide to truth
even when such a group is less likely to agree on the truth than a correspond-
ing group of less autonomous experts, provided that the former’s degree of
autonomy exceeds that of the latter’s to a sufficiently high degree.
19Proof: We prove that (5) and (7) jointly entail (6). Given our definition in (2), (7) can
be written as follows:
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)/ n∏
i=1
Pr(XBi (H,E))
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
)/ n∏
i=1
Pr(XAi (H,E))
>
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
By (5), this simplifies to:
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
) > Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Rearranging and multiplying both sides by Pr(H), we get:
Pr(H)× Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XAi (H,E)
) > Pr(H)× Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
∣∣∣H)
Pr
( n∧
i=1
XBi (H,E)
)
Which is equivalent to (6) by Bayes’s Theorem.
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3.3 What Good is Reliability of Expert Agreement?
Having seen how epistemic autonomy increases the reliability of expert agree-
ment via a kind of testimonial consilience, the next thing to consider is why
this kind of reliability is something worth having in expert groups. Clearly,
the answer will have something to do with the fact that we look to experts to
provide us with correct information about issues falling within their domain
of expertise. But it is worth digging a little deeper here, asking ourselves why
it’s so important that the claims on which experts within some domain are
in agreement can reliably be taken as true. As alluded to before, I want to
suggest that there are two importantly different considerations here.
On the one hand, reliability of expert agreement is crucial to laypeople who
rely on expert opinion as a source of information. Consider, for example, the
way in which scientific results communicated by experts are used in policy
making processes, including public policy. In contexts of that sort, agreement
among experts must be taken to be reliable in order for their testimony to
serve its purpose as a basis for policy. For example, consider the frequently-
cited consensus on anthropogenic climate change – the theory that human
influence is a significant contributing cause of the recent rise in mean global
temperatures. Reliability of expert agreement is valuable, in part, because
we want to be able to cite expert agreements of this kind in arguments that
the agreed-upon theories are indeed true (or likely to be true). If agreement
among experts were not a reliable guide to truth, scientifically-informed public
policy would be more-or-less impossible in its current form.
On the other hand, reliability of expert agreement is also valuable to other
experts, i.e. experts whose domain of expertise does not overlap with that of
the agreeing experts. Increasing specialization in nearly all fields of inquiry
makes it impossible for anyone to be an expert outside a relatively limited
domain. Thus, any expert in some domain Di will be a non-expert with regard
to some other domain Dj. At the same time, results from the other domain
Dj will often be highly relevant to the expert’s work in her own domain Di,
20This is a familiar point. See, e.g., Hardwig (1985, 1991), Thagard (1997), Wray (2002),
and Andersen and Wagenknecht (2013).
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such that our Di-expert is in many ways forced to rely on the testimony of Dj-
experts in order to make progress in her own investigations.20 In so far as our
Di-expert seeks correct information about Dj, she will rely only on what Dj-
experts agree on; but of course that will only be reliable information in so far
this kind of expert agreement is a reliable indicator of truth. So, a Di-expert
can only trust information from Dj-experts in so far as agreement among the
latter is a reliable indicator of truth. Since relying on experts’ testimony in this
way is indispensable to almost all contemporary inquiry, reliability of expert
agreement is vital for cumulative intellectual progress.
It is worth emphasizing just how common it is for experts in different do-
mains to rely on each other’s work in this way, and thus how important it
is for intellectual progress that groups of experts provide reliable testimony.
Consider, for example, a theoretical astrophysicists who specializes in cosmic
rays, high-energy radiation which originates outside of the Earth’s atmosphere.
Being a theoretical astrophysicist, she will not herself have made the empirical
observations or constructed the data models on the basis of which her theo-
ries are constructed. Instead, she will rely on information on which there is
agreement among her colleagues in observational astrophysics. Similarly, since
cosmic rays are thought to consist of photons and other high-energy particles,
theoretical research into cosmic rays frequently appeal to recent research in
particle physics. However, while astrophysicists will be knowledgable about
large-scale physical theories such as the general relativity, they are rarely ex-
perts on recent developments within particle physics,21 so they are typically
forced to rely on what other experts agree on when their own research ap-
peals to specific results about high-energy particles. Finally, like almost all
other natural scientists, astrophysicists frequently rely on the expert opinions
of mathematicians for theorems and derivations relevant to their own research.
In sum, then, reliability of expert agreement is valuable in at least two ways,
viz. in (a) undergirding reliable application of expert knowledge, e.g. in public
policy, and (b) promoting intellectual progress through reliable inter-domain
21Although there are notable exceptions, such as Samuel Ting at Princeton. Ting received
the Nobel prize in physics for work on particle physics in 1976, but now leads a massive
research project on cosmic rays (The Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer, AMS-02).
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communication between experts. Given the probabilistic argument presented
earlier, this confers value on expert autonomy since agreement among more au-
tonomous experts is a more reliable indicator of truth than agreement among
less autonomous, but otherwise identical, experts. In this way, epistemic au-
tonomy has a kind of instrumental value as a means to promoting reliable
applications of expert knowledge and cumulative intellectual progress.
4 Conclusion
I began with the observation that there seems to be a sense in which, ideally,
experts should make up their own minds about issues that fall within their
domain of expertise, as opposed to following the opinions of their fellow ex-
perts. Partly in response to Zagzebski’s anti-egoistic argument that privileging
one’s own belief-forming mechanisms would be incoherent, I provided an in-
terpretation of this idea by appealing to the notion of expert acceptance – the
Ideal of Expert Autonomy. I then argued that, all other things being equal,
this kind of epistemic autonomy among experts makes their joint testimony
more reliable, which in turn brings epistemic benefits both to laypeople and
to experts in other fields – the Whewellian Rationale. In closing, it is worth
drawing out how this support the general idea, endorsed by many social epis-
temologists, that the epistemic prescriptions appropriate for individuals may
not serve the epistemic purposes of the groups such individuals comprise.22
According to the Whewellian Rationale, the value of epistemic autonomy does
not consist in its being epistemically beneficial for the individual autonomous
experts themselves. Rather, the value of this kind of autonomy is distinctively
social in two distinct senses of the term: First, the epistemic benefits of expert
22A systematic discussion of this idea is provided by Mayo-Wilson, Zollman and Danks,
who refer to it as the Independence Thesis (Mayo-Wilson et al., 2011, 654). Another well-
known argument for something like this idea is provided by Kitcher (1990, 1993) and Strevens
(2003), who argue that a scientific community as a whole is more likely to discover truths
when each scientist in it strives only for personal credit, rather than aiming to discover
the truth. Similarly, Zollman (2007, 2010) argues that under certain conditions, groups
of individuals who ignore certain information from other members will be more reliable
than groups in which such information flows freely. Finally, Bishop (2005) argues that the
respective principles of social and individual rationality recommend distinct, and indeed
inconsistent, beliefs.
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autonomy are primarily conferred upon agents other than the autonomous ex-
perts themselves – viz. laypeople and other experts. Second, the epistemic
value of expert autonomy is also social in the sense that these benefits arise not
from the practice of consulting individual experts, but from that of consulting
groups of experts about what its members agree on.23
23Research for this paper was supported by an Irish Research Council New Horizons grant
for the project When Experts Disagree (Project ID: REPRO/2015/89). For discussions and
helpful feedback, I am grateful to Maria Baghramian, Luke Drury, Elmar Unnsteinsson,
Nick Hughes, Ed Nettel, MA students in the Disagreement module at University College
Dublin, and audiences at the Third Lisbon International Conference on Philosophy of Sci-
ence, Queens University Belfast, University College Dublin, and the University of Iceland. I
am also indebted to Liam Kofi Bright, Elanor Taylor, Huginn Thorsteinsson, and an anony-
mous reviewer for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for extraordinarily helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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